This text explores the complex and varied history of the religion and its traditions. Bismarck originally saw domestic and international alliances as interchangeable, since both belonged to the same game. From there, this model spread to engulf what had essentially become a Eurocentric world. History has no shortage of tales showing that the relation between prophecy and its materialization is more dependent on the powers and associations of the prophet than on the inert or substantive merit of the prophecy itself. But the fact that in his traditional upbringing he had already received the armory of self-discipline, the gift of observance, and an entitlement to status through initiation means that the basic building blocks for a universal assimilation of stimuli and knowledge are already in place.
This story, of course, is complicated and cannot be reduced to the formula of ideal types described here. At what point does the logic of fusion give way to the logic of distinction? In other words, they have no intrinsic essence. The model highlighted action and potential over nature and essence: People oriented toward the road experience solidarity as expansive rather than as tied irretrievably to self-enclosed and nonnegotiable local systems of reference. On the one end of the spectrum we see forms of governance that understood their role as especially transformative, extractive, or interventionist, often with divine blessing. Processes leading to globalization—which for governance entail the concomitant dissolution of the self-referential realm—have only increased the number and scale of foes an order of governance has to reckon with. But there is a larger picture to be gleaned.
In each society, Deutsch suggested, there 134 The Cultural Landscape of Globalization existed essential units or channels of communication that enhanced feelings of togetherness. This emerging tradition is to be explored in more detail in chapter 2. In what follows, I will outline six basic and fundamental areas of disjunction between traditional and passing imperialist systems—as outlined in the traditional theory of imperialism—and the emerging logics of power deployment today. Usually, this is the opposite of the former approach: Local or situational phenomena are brought together to explain the global. Ibn Battuta, a Muslim judge and scholar who traversed west, north, and east Africa; the Middle East; south, Southeast, and central Asia; and some of China gave far less attention than Marco Polo to the nature and rituals of political authorities of the lands he visited. At a more fundamental level, the image pinned authority on a certain conception of universal nature. Lengthy trips contributed to a cosmopolitan culture not only by exposing travelers to cross-cultural encounters over many years but, more importantly, by normalizing life on the road.
The author's orientation toward political theory and comparative civilizations-a rarity in globalization studies-allows him to detect in specific terms what is most dangerous and opportune in what is happening in the world today. Globalization, on the other hand, is a broader concept. The menace of the state after the end of this war stems precisely from its unpredictability, now that it is devoid of all ideological grounding. The more coercion is referenced, the less secure is the claim to legitimacy. That different motives are involved in economic action is not a novel idea in the social sciences. Note: Data for Japan and Thailand are for 1992; for Egypt, 1993; for all others, 1994.
An intervention into current debates about globalization, nationalism, imperialism, and culture, this book offers a cogent critique of much of what is being said about globalization, by both the Right and the Left. This book is essential reading for students and academics in a wide range of fields, including sociology, history, law, and political science. In a way, he was observing that the road, even more than the sword, carried its own magic of cultural diffusion. But in terms of the ideational pillars of the postcolonial world as seen from the outside, an alternative to the state as such is unthinkable and, wherever it is vocal enough, could invite violent suppression. How are its signals transmitted? Premodern transnational cultures were fed by different inputs, such as common spiritual ideas and expectations supplied by the great world religions. This book traces the erosion of these totalities in our age; the politicoeconomic dissimulations are addressed in chapter 1, the cultural ones in Preface xi chapter 3. All such dynamics forced the prince to go back more frequently to local suzerains and ask for more in tax revenues to meet such needs.
It can also be detected where programs of unity are either constitutionally ingrained or frequently attempted, as in the Arab Maghreb. The resulting disorientation is usually so pervasive, in fact, that the most complete representation of it can only be literary. Examples include Punjab and Kashmir, which are divided between India and Pakistan; Ossetia, which is now divided between Russia and Georgia; and Macedonia, shared by Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and, of course, the former Yugoslav province of Macedonia. Strength and Weakness of the State Under traditional imperialism, capitalism throve because of the protective power of a strong state. Wherever this modern state emerged more due to the imperatives of emulation than to relatively autonomous processes, as in much of the postcolonial world, one can readily document a greater amount of effort needed by governing orders to ensure peace, regime survival, law enforcement, and public cooperation with regulation emanating from above. The continuous, daily renewability of this stale, tired identity obviously offends the sensibilities of the cosmopolitans among us, many of whom despise both the conformist citizens of mass society and their cynical government. The old-fashioned predictability of imperialism stemmed from a clear strategic vision fed by a totalistic conceptual outlook.
In contrast to the received vision of the traditional as local and self-enclosed, the modern was presented in terms of inherently transnational tropes. The New Imperialism: Six Theses 59 3. Here, political governance becomes fundamentally a model whose basic features are rooted not in local traditions but in its more glorious manifestations of itself on the global scene. To put it another way, whereas in 1985 there was an average of 23,442 per million scientific and technical personnel in the world, the average was 8,263 for the developing countries; 70,452 for the developed countries; and 126,200, or more than fifteen times the average for developing countries, for North America. In the light of cultural exchange today, the more enduring cultural distinctions national or otherwise are visible to the audience not in the form but mostly in the content of cultural production.
The more coercion is referenced, the more evidenced are the inaudible, substate spheres of representation, spheres in which an autonomous and largely ideational as opposed to institutionally generated and structured culture is produced and reproduced across generational lines. For these reformers, revivalism essentially meant explicitly the rejuvenation of the old faith, so that it could creatively tackle the issues and spirit of modernity itself, rather than a reinvention of the past as it had been. Transforming the Facade In recent history the imposition of the straitjacket of the nation-state on these diverse origins must be understood in terms of the predominance of the Eurocentric attention to the question of nationalities after World War I. Or must it continue to be infused with moral authority from which guidance is expected? How far the challenge succeeds depends on its connection to the deepest roots of the modern system, roots that had various claims to civilizational linkages. Al-Jabarti describes in disbelief how sheikh Napoleon had already claimed this authenticity for himself, in a remarkable and early display of boundless cynicism. Would that simple act of reciprocating a communicative gesture have changed history? It began its long disintegration only after Aurangzeb d.
Under such conditions, political control is needed only for bare-bones system maintenance, since it is expected that a global economic system is 1 either capable of functioning on its own with minimal political support, 2 requires a diminished state role in order to operate properly, or 3 is just too complex for any globallevel political adoption of it to be effective. Earlier comparative research has already indicated that they do not. The philosophers just discussed are certainly not the only ones who ventured into modes of philosophizing that were symptomatic of an orientation toward a universal dimension of knowledge, actions, or interests as bases of expansive culture. For some of the more systematic critiques, see Falk; Rosenberg. This summary of the main cultural and political features of the global era shows us a scene of enormous dislocations, which can be experienced either as possibilities or as new nightmares. These become sources for the introduction of a sense of individual autonomy that national cultures, themselves long infused with those universalizing ethos, can no longer suppress.